Competition law is designed to promote a consumer-friendly economy, but for the law to work in practice, competition agencies - and the courts who oversee them - must enforce it effectively and impartially. Today, however, the rule of populist governments is challenging the foundations of competition law in unprecedented ways. In this comprehensive work, Maciej Bernatt analyses these challenges and describes how populist governments have influenced national and regional (EU) competition law systems. Using empirical findings from Poland and Hungary, Bernatt proposes a new theoretical framework that will allow the illiberal influence of populism on competition law systems to be better measured and understood. Populism and Antitrust will be of interest not only to antitrust and constitutional law scholars, but also to those concerned about the future of liberal democracy and free markets.



TABLE OF CONTENTS



Part I Background: Populism, Democracy, Economy


1 Introduction


2 Populism and Its Relationship with Democracy and the Economy


Part II Populist Influence on Competition Law Systems


3 Conceptualization of the Impact of Populism on Competition Law Systems


4 Institutions


5 Enforcement


Part III A Regional System


6 A Regional System: The Case of the EU


Part IV Final Diagnosis and Prospects


7 Conclusions and the Way Forward


Bibliography


Index