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_c6469 _d6469 |
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| 001 | 20701003 | ||
| 003 | ES-MaCNC | ||
| 005 | 20241129140413.0 | ||
| 008 | 180821s2019 mau b 001 0 eng c | ||
| 020 | _a9780674975781 | ||
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_cES-MaCNC _aES-MaCNC |
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| 082 | 0 | 0 |
_a338.8/20973 _223 |
| 100 |
_aBaker, Jonathan B. _97340 |
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| 245 | 0 | 4 |
_aThe antitrust paradigm : _brestoring a competitive economy |
| 260 |
_aCambridge, Massachusetts _bHarvard University Press _c2019 |
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| 300 |
_a349 p. _c24 cm. |
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| 336 |
_2isbdcontent _aTexto (visual) |
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| 337 |
_2isbdmedia _asin mediación |
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| 520 | _aIn the 1970s, when the United States economy was struggling and the term "stagflation" was coined to capture inflation plus stagnant business growth, the "Chicago school" critique of antitrust rules gained ascendance. In the 1980s, during Ronald Reagan's two terms as president, that critique's policy prescriptions-the eliminating of or modifying anticompetitive rules to make them less restrictive-became common practice. As Jonathan Baker writes, "The Chicago approach to antitrust can be understood as a gamble. More relaxed antitrust rules would allow firms to achieve greater efficiencies, which would more than compensate for any risk of firms exercising market power. Put differently, the Chicagoans bet that antitrust reform could achieve long term consumer welfare gains without facilitating the creation of substantial and durable market power." The Antitrust Paradigm presents a wealth of evidence arguing that the Chicagoans lost their bet, and prescribes what should be done about it. Since the 1980s, not only has market power widened, economic productivity decline, and consumer welfare gains been modest at best, but also the economy has changed, most visibly in the information technology and Internet giants that top the financial market's valuation charts. Baker argues that both the failures of antitrust reform and the changed economy demand a new antitrust paradigm, one that restores a competitive economy through strengthened antitrust, recognizes antitrust's political context, and identifies the competitive harms from dominant information technology platforms. His book frames the problem, examines the distinctive competitive problems of the information economy, and concludes with a guide for restoring effective antitrust policies. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_aCompetencia _9203 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aDerecho _9332 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aDerecho de la competencia _9356 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aEconomía digital _97243 |
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| 653 | 0 | _aAntitrust | |
| 653 | 0 | _aDefensa de la competencia | |
| 653 | 0 | _aImpacto económico | |
| 653 | 0 | _aEficiencia económica | |
| 653 | 0 | _aPoder de mercado | |
| 653 | 0 | _aPlataformas digitales | |
| 653 | 0 | _aCompetitividad | |
| 653 | 0 | _aSociedad de la información | |
| 653 | 0 | _aAlgoritmos | |
| 653 | 0 | _aPrácticas de exclusión | |
| 653 | 0 | _aAbuso de posición dominante | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 |
_zVer índice _uhttp://bibliotecacnmc.bage.es/cgi-bin/koha/opac-retrieve-file.pl?id=673b097c2eeeceb11b83bad6e4b7b26e |
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_2udc _cMON |
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